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he impacts of climate change can 
be analysed with the same 
economic assessment tools used 
for analysing the impacts of changing 
economic conditions. The fundamental 
concept is that impacts of climate 
change will affect the behaviour of 
economic agents, who will adapt autonomously, but autonomous adaptation is not always the optimal 
solution. This paper explains that by analysing the behaviour of people as a consequence of climate change, 
the resulting scenarios can help policy-makers in designing policies where autonomous adaptation does not 
reflect a social optimum.  However, economic analyses of this topic are still scarce. The importance of 
concentrating on such analyses is that structural change is a continuing process in all European economies, 
but climate change may contribute to faster and more vigorous changes with corresponding challenges for 
policy-makers. 
 
Introduction 
An attempt to summarise the state of knowledge 
about social and economic challenges related to 
climate change, for example based on the latest 
IPCC reports, would probably give the impression 
that impacts, adaptation and vulnerability are a 
question of interactions between people and 
institutions within small local communities (IPCC, 
2007a), whereas mitigation can be addressed by 
political analyses and economics (IPCC, 2007b). In 
most economic studies, the motivation behind 
mitigation is presented as that of limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions to a given target (see e.g. 
Weyant, 1999 and Chesnaye & Weyant, 2007).  
With documentation of the costs of mitigation, it is 
also necessary however to do economic evaluations 
of impacts and adaptation options in order to set 
appropriate targets. An increasing number of so-
called ‘integrated economic analyses’ of climate 
change  have  therefore  been  conducted  in  recent  
 
years. Early studies, such as Nordhaus (1991) and 
Cline (1992), aimed at economic assessments of the 
impacts of climate change. Recognition of the fact 
that adaptation may reduce the costs of impacts 
substantially has more recently led economists to 
also address the potential benefits of adaptation 
options (see e.g. Tol, 2002). The bulk of the literature 
on adaptation and vulnerability emphasises, however, 
that adaptation has to be considered in a broader 
perspective. Economic implications are, in fact, 
rarely dealt with in this literature, which focuses 
more on how stakeholders interact and learn from 
each other. 
On the other hand, economics is, in general, a tool 
for analysing adaptation to changes in economic 
constraints with reference to assumptions about how 
economic agents behave. If one can tell how climate 
change affects economic constraints, adaptation can 
be analysed and understood by economics. From the 
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point of view of policy-making, the advantage of 
this approach is that it helps our understanding of 
what economic agents do autonomously to adapt to 
climate change and thereby allows us to identify 
cases where a public policy strategy for adaptation 
may be required. The purpose of this note is to 
show how adaptation is driven by climate-induced 
changes in economic constraints, and to point out 
political challenges on the way towards adequate 
and smooth adaptation. 
Autonomous adaptation 
Autonomous direct adaptation can be described as 
changes that economic agents make when 
confronted with climate change. These changes can 
be shifts in the composition of input needed to 
produce the same output, for example the needs to 
use more fertilizer to produce the same amount of 
crop per unit of land after as before climate change. 
Or, these changes can be due to consumers who for 
example increase the use of private car 
transportation to go to work if global warming leads 
to more rainy days. The first type of change is 
interpreted as changes in the technology of the 
economy where the producers are the market actors 
who adapt to climate change. The second type of 
change is interpreted as shifts in the preference 
structure of the consumers in the economy.  
Autonomous  indirect adaptation is the market 
response resulting from autonomous direct 
adaptation. When the supply and demand curve shifts 
because of climate change, the supply of the affected 
goods and services will no longer be equal to 
demand, and prices and quantities will therefore be 
adjusted until a new equilibrium is attained. This 
means that the relative prices of all goods and 
services are affected, which gives rise to a range of 
indirect effects. These two steps of autonomous 
adaptation in the economy, direct and indirect, are 
illustrated in Figure 1. The example chosen is a 
market for air conditioners, where the demand 
increases due to an increase in temperature.  
 
Figure 1. An illustrative example of direct and indirect autonomous adaptation 
 
 
The initial situation (before climate change) in this 
market of air conditioners is A, where quantity 
demanded is X1 and the price is P1. The upward 
line from origin is the supply curve of air 
conditioners. The two parallel lines crossing the 
supply curve are initial demand (dotted) and new 
demand for air conditioners. With an increase in 
temperature, a larger share of the consumers in this 
market demand air conditioners to maintain their 
preferred level of indoor comfort. The increase in 
aggregated demand in the market for air conditioners 
is illustrated in the outward shift from the stippled 
line to the parallel. The change in quantity demanded 
is the increase from X1 to X2. 
This shift is an example of what we call direct 
autonomous adaptation, which gives a new situation 
B, with excess demand for air conditioners and hence 
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a market in disequilibrium. The restoring of 
equilibrium gives a third situation, C, in our 
stylised illustration, where the quantity demanded 
is X3 and the price of air conditioners has increased 
from P1 to P2. This adjustment back to equilibrium, 
or the market effects from direct autonomous 
adaptation, is an example of what we call indirect 
autonomous adaptation. 
Challenges for public policy 
If all economic transactions were carried out as 
explained in economics textbooks, in which 
markets are perfect and economic agents respond 
consequently and instantaneously to shifts in the 
environment, the best and most efficient way to 
adapt would be to let each and everyone take 
his/her own responsibility and act according to 
his/her own beliefs. Public bodies and proactive 
public strategies for adaptation would be 
superfluous, in principle. In analyses of impacts 
and adaptation to climate change, the problem 
would be limited to that of determining the correct 
parameters for modelling, which itself is 
challenging enough. 
It is important to have this in mind, because it 
signifies the fact that a lot of adaptation to climate 
change will take place without public policy 
interference. To the extent that impacts of climate 
change can be related to production technologies 
and consumers’ preferences, autonomous 
adaptation is also inherent in traditional economic 
analysis of market behaviour. However, the full 
potential for adaptation to climate change will not 
be utilised by the markets alone. In cases where the 
presumptions for perfect markets are violated, 
public policy strategies become essential. It is 
therefore useful to examine circumstances under 
which adaptation to impacts of climate change 
happens under imperfect market conditions. These 
can be classified as cases where the adaptation 
measure is a public good, when the transaction 
costs are large and when adaptation requires that 
primary factors of productions will have to be 
moved physically (immobility). 
Public goods 
Many potential adaptation measures are public 
goods. These are measures that, if implemented, 
will benefit more than one economic agent. Among 
typical public goods adaptation measures we can 
mention dikes, land-slide entrenchments, road and 
railway constructions and protection walls against 
floods. Moreover, means to improve knowledge 
and institutional capacity, such as risk assessments, 
evacuation plans and land-use planning, are public 
goods. Problems that arise when public goods are 
traded in traditional markets with individual 
decision-making have been acknowledged among 
economists since the 1930s, when Pigou (1932) 
pointed out that air pollution is a public bad that 
should be subject to taxation. However, it was not 
before the 1970s and 1980s that allocation of public 
goods attracted major attention among economists, 
although the rise in interest in public choice theory 
can be associated with Buchanan’s (1954) criticism 
of the view that decisions of the state can be analysed 
as if made by a single person.  
The basic problem with public goods is that if 
adaptation strategies are based solely on autonomous 
adaptation, the amount of implemented measures will 
be lower than the socially beneficial amount. This is 
because the full cost of the measure is placed on the 
agent who implements it, whereas this agent receives 
only a part of the benefit. Individuals will therefore 
lack incentives to invest in a public good. The 
standard solution to this problem is to make agents 
cooperate and/or to leave the decision to a public 
body, which in our case means to make adaptation an 
issue for the public authorities. 
However, developing adaptation strategies for 
climate change will have to be based on expectations 
about impacts. From an economic point of view, a 
reasonable principle for an adaptation strategy would 
be that the expected marginal cost of climate change 
covers the marginal cost of public adaptation 
measures. It may be easy to obtain a consensus on 
this principle, but given the vast uncertainty about 
the impacts, there will be different opinions as to 
what is to be expected. Palm (1995) points out that 
experience is probably the most important factor 
behind people’s realisation of risk, and that realising 
risk also means that the perceived risk becomes 
higher. People who are exposed to natural hazards 
are, therefore, likely to consider the risk as being 
higher than those who are not exposed. If so, those 
exposed to high risk are willing to pay more for the 
public good than the actually implemented amount. 
This may spur implementation of public goods by 
private agents with a possible benefit to others, but 
also with a neglect of possible negative externalities. 
Both are potential sources of ineffectiveness. 
In particular, protection against slides and floods 
often implies that the masses are led away from an 
exposed spot. The risks in the surrounding area 
thereby increase with possible higher risk of damage 
to other agents, without being evident at first sight. 
For example, slide entrenchments may change the 
direction of slides and increase the vulnerability of 
buildings outside the protected area. The risk of 
floods can be reduced by removing potential 
damming in one area, but with an increase of flood 
risk downstream. A public adaptation strategy should 
therefore aim at high confidence in risk assessments 
and provide information to exposed people in order 
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reduces the potential for conflicting views among 
people, thereby reducing also the potential for 
ineffective adaptation.  
Transaction costs 
The existence of transaction costs is associated 
with Coase’s (1937) distinction between tasks 
performed by the firm and tasks performed by the 
market, but may also be related to Buchanan’s 
criticism of the view that public decisions can be 
analysed as if made by individual persons. In 
general, transaction costs comprise all costs 
incurred in making an exchange of goods and 
services, such as the provision of information, 
learning to use it, building partnerships and 
negotiations. Transaction costs are necessary to 
make the exchange of goods and services happen. 
However, being subject to institutional factors and 
skills, among other factors, they may also depend 
on who delivers what to whom. This makes the 
‘unit cost’, which is essential in defining the point 
of reference in economics, a rather vague concept. 
In order to point out cost-effective strategies of 
adaptation, it is necessary also to examine the 
transaction costs. 
Adaptation to increased frequency of natural 
disasters provides a case with potentially high 
transaction costs. Adaptation measures for natural 
hazards are often public goods, and central 
governments do take responsibility for 
implementing means of prevention and protection 
in most European countries. Being subject to public 
policy priorities, adaptation strategies will reflect 
more issues than just the achievement of cost 
effectiveness. Natural hazards are usually 
considered as random events, where innocent 
victims suffer great losses. It is a common view 
that those who happen to be rammed should at least 
be spared the economic burden of their losses. This 
is why public bodies in most countries cover losses 
of damage after natural disasters, including non-
public goods.  
The challenge in this respect is that single agents 
who do not pay, or do not expect to pay, the full 
cost of damages do not have the right incentives to 
implement a private-good means for adaptation 
either. This is the background for moral hazard in 
economics. Private-goods adaptation measures may 
be the means to strengthen the construction of 
buildings or decisions about the placement of 
buildings. For example, the incentive for a private-
property owner to build in a landslide-prone spot 
with a view or at the shore of a river with the risk 
of flooding is higher if he expects that the damage 
from landslides or floods is covered by someone 
else.  
In most countries, this implies that private agents 
may apply for development in risky zones that 
should not be developed, but it is up to the local 
authorities to approve or reject the proposed project. 
Thus, if local authorities take the responsibility for 
the economic loss of natural hazards, the process of 
approvals would in principle assure a cost-effective 
adaptation strategy. However, the responsibility is, at 
best, unclear in European countries. Incentives for 
local authorities to approve development are, on the 
other hand, clear in most cases. The decision to 
develop is therefore easily decoupled from the risk of 
hazards. 
Appropriate adaptation strategies will save societies 
from economic losses related to climate change. 
Even without climate change, there seems to be a 
potential for cost savings in cases of extreme weather 
events by clarification of responsibilities, and the 
search for incentives for individuals to implement 
private-good measures to protect their own property. 
Under climate change the extra costs of disincentives 
and unclear responsibilities may become huge, and 
the need for appropriate adaptation strategies 
correspondingly important, for example by 
encouraging planning procedures to avoid 
development in risky areas. 
Immobility 
In an ideally competitive market, the potential for 
autonomous adaptation is significant. Capital can be 
moved about freely, labour is fully mobile and 
natural resources are national endowments that 
contribute equally to communities without economic 
resources as to communities with economic 
resources. Services may, moreover, be produced in 
one place and demanded in another. The real world 
is, of course, more constrained, and the question is 
then whether and when adaptation to climate change 
is impeded because of such constraints and what can 
be done to facilitate adaptation.  
Natural resources and attractions of economic value 
are, in general, sensitive to changes in climate. The 
economic activities they generate are usually placed 
close to where the resources are found, either for 
historical reasons, such as for fisheries, or because it 
is necessary, such as for tourism. Some local 
communities thereby become heavily dependent on 
the climate, and relatively marginal climatic changes 
may substantially change the value of specific natural 
conditions: Changes in ocean temperature may affect 
fish stocks substantially (Toresen & Østvedt, 2000), 
the attractiveness of beach resorts depends on a 
relatively narrow range of day temperatures during 
the summer (Hein, 2007) and the best ski resorts are 
places where it is cold enough to keep the snow from 
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Even moderate climatic changes may, therefore, 
affect a large share of these local communities.  
Because of the dependency of the affected 
economic activities, the socioeconomic 
consequences are also likely to be more serious 
than if similar effects occur in larger and 
economically more diversified communities. The 
immediate result of a decline in economic activity 
is lower income and unemployment. Having lost 
the core activity, there are few alternatives in local 
communities. Thus, people will have to move to get 
a new job. The resulting unemployment is therefore 
likely to last for a longer period if it occurs in rural 
districts than urban areas. Older employees, in 
particular, may have to retire early. 
Similar differences can be predicted also for the 
loss of value of real capital. The drop in prices of 
commercial and private buildings will be larger 
because the possibilities of finding buyers is less 
when the core activity closes down and people 
move out of the area. In addition, the core activities 
constitute the basis for many other economic 
activities. Various kinds of services, for example, 
will be affected harder in a small community than 
in a larger community. The customers in larger 
communities are likely to be recruited from a 
broader range of economic sectors, thereby making 
them less vulnerable. 
Structural changes are a continuing process in all 
European economies, but climate change may 
contribute to faster and more vigorous changes 
with corresponding challenges to policy-makers. 
Encouraging flexibility of local communities will, 
in general, enhance the adaptive capacity of local 
communities. This may be stimulated by 
facilitating establishment of new business, 
education and post-education as well as 
programmes for local restructuring. But attention 
also to the possibility of local unemployment and 
social exclusion will have to be a part of the 
adaptation strategy. 
Concluding remarks: An overview of 
potential adaptation measures 
Adaptation to climate change has clear similarities 
with economic behaviour, and may also be 
understood and analysed within the framework of 
economic analysis. As economic agents interact 
and achieve a socially acceptable outcome through 
markets, they will also adapt to climate change 
autonomously without interference from a central 
authority. The final impacts of climate change are 
thereby moderated. 
The need to develop adaptation strategies by 
central authorities emerges under imperfect market 
conditions, such as when the adaptation measure is 
a public good or if the transaction costs related to 
adaptation are large. Two factors seem to be of vital 
importance for the magnitude of the transaction 
costs. The first is the extent and character of the 
uncertainty about the impact of climate change, as 
uncertainty extends the room for diverging views and 
conflicts of interest among agents. The second factor 
relates to the fact that adaptation takes time, and 
substantial losses may accrue in the meantime.  
Despite the close relationship between standard 
economic analysis and analyses of adaptation to 
climate change, very little is known about the 
economic potential for adaptation strategies or the 
economic costs of adaptation options. The message 
of this note is that the design of adaptation strategies 
should address areas where autonomous adaptation is 
insufficient, and where public intervention is 
therefore required. The design of adaptation 
strategies is therefore closely related to the impacts 
of climate change. Economic analyses of impacts are 
still relatively scarce, and the basis for analysis of 
adaptation is therefore weak.  
It is, however, possible to provide an overview of 
climate change impacts in order to sort out possible 
areas of interest with respect to the design of 
adaptation strategies. Table 1 lists possible impacts 
from climate change by sector and possible 
adaptation measures, classified according to our 
description of direct and indirect autonomous 
adaptation and adaptation initiated by public 
institutions. The three columns under ‘Autonomous 
direct’ indicate which economic agent is adapting: 
‘Consumer’, ‘Producer’ or ‘Public’. The last column 
gives examples of autonomous indirect adaptation 
that may follow from the direct adaptation.  
Such a table may be used to sort out topical areas for 
the design of adaptation strategies. Although 
consumers and producers will adapt autonomously, 
public intervention may be advantageous in some 
cases. For example, education and information 
campaigns may be needed to facilitate the switch to 
drought-resistant species, whereas regulation of 
fertilizer is likely to happen smoothly without public 
intervention. As discussed above, the adaptation 
strategy will in some cases depend on predefined 
responsibilities. In countries where the health sector 
is mainly a public domain, for example, health 
effects will necessarily constitute a part of a public 
strategy for adaptation. This may be the case also in 
countries where the health sector is mainly a private 
domain, but the point of focus will be different. 
Where health is a public domain, the adaptation 
strategy includes capacity-building and prioritising 
tasks within the health sector. Countries with 
emphasis on private health care may limit the focus 
more on prevention, e.g. through vaccination 
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Table 1. Examples of climate change impacts and types of adaptation 
Autonomous direct  Impacted 
sector 
Specific impact  Adaptation measure 
Consumer Producer  Public 
Autonomous indirect 
Agriculture  Drought  i) Switch to more 
drought-resistant 
species 
 X    Increased price of 
less drought-resistant 
species 
 Drainage  of 
nutrients 
i) Increase use of 
fertilizer 
 X    Increase in price of 
fertilizer 
    ii) Support scheme 
for fertiliser for 
vulnerable farmers 
   X   
Transport Increase  in 
precipitation 
i) Increased use of 
cars 
X      
   ii)  Increase  public 
transport capacity 
   X   
Tourism Higher 
temperatures in 
warm destinations 
i) Switch to less 
warm destinations 
X     Higher unemploy-
ment in tourist sector 
in warm destinations 
  Less snow in ski 
destinations 
i) Rebuild for 
recreation 
   X   
Electricity More  precipitation  i)  Increase 
production capacity 
 X    Decrease in price of 
electricity 
 Higher 
temperatures 
ii) Decreased use of 
electricity for heating 
X     Decrease in price of 
electricity 
Health  Heat waves  i) Increase use of 
health services 
X     Increase in price of 
health services 
 Vector-  borne 
diseases 
ii) Vaccination 
programmes 
   X   
    Increase capacity in 
health sector 
 X  X  Higher wages in 
health sector 
Building sector  Land slides  i) Entrenchments     X   
    ii) Prepare evaluation 
plan 
   X   
   iii)  Establish 
alternative routes 
   X   
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